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Abstract
The East German experience with EU membership (after unification in 1990)
probably comes close to what might be called a controlled experiment for assessing the
growth effects of EU membership. East Germany could rely on the tried and tested rules
and institutions of the West German social market economy and had immediate access
to large amounts of financial resources in the form of public transfers. Notwithstanding
these rather unique favorable starting conditions, high-flying expectations have been
disappointed so far.
This paper uses an open-economy neoclassical growth model as a measure of
reference against which the actual performance of the East German economy can be
evaluated. Ignoring the very first years after unification, the theoretically predicted
growth rate for the period 1993-2000 exceeds the observed growth rate by an order of
magnitude. With no obvious differences in institutions and technology, and with
physical capital accumulation in East Germany exceeding the West German rate,
differences in human capital remain as the major reason for differences between the
theoretical and the actual East German growth rate. Simulation results suggest that East
Germany’s stock of human capital per worker reaches only about one third of the West
Germany level.
The possibility that human capital rather than physical capital seems to be the
decisive bottleneck for growth and convergence should dampen overly optimistic
growth expectations of EU membership in the present group of accession countries.
Since the economically relevant stock of human capital cannot be increased as easily as
the stock of physical capital, the main lesson from the East German experience for other
EU accession countries is that catching up may come to a halt below the EU average,
even under pretty favorable institutional and financial conditions.
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Foreword
by János Gács
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the
Economic Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU
Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was
particularly encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member
organizations, while financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national
member organization, the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research
(FRN). Preparations for the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of
communication two workshops, one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm
in May 2001, helped to elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work
and discuss results. Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects
started in September 2001.
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows.
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided
under the Common Agricultural Policy.
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities.
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied.
vThe following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs;
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries’ development based on the
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context
of EU accession.
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Erich Gundlach
I. Introduction and Overview
Economic history provides some examples for economic miracles with
exorbitant rates of growth after natural disasters or man-made catastrophes. What
happened in the aftermath of the devastating Kobe earthquake in January 1995 is
probably the most recent example for an economic miracle following a natural disaster.
Although almost all infrastructure including roads, utilities, and the port facilities had
been destroyed, manufacturing output in the greater Kobe area and the volume of
international trade passing through its port were back at their pre-quake levels only one
year later (Horwich 2000). Somewhat closer to the topic of this paper, the West-German
experience after the currency reform of 1948 has been regarded by many as an example
for an economic miracle in the aftermath of a terrible man-made catastrophe. As early
as 1950, West German industrial production had roughly doubled and growth remained
strong for about the next 25 years (Giersch et al. 1992).
These examples show that high rates of growth and convergence to a persistently
high level of the standard of living are possible if the destruction of specific economic
assets can be substituted for by other economic assets. Given the historical record, it is
therefore understandable that German unification (and hence East Germany’s EU
membership) in 1990 immediately raised high-flying expectations of "blossoming
landscapes" in the eastern Länder within less than a decade. A similar reasoning seems
to prevail in many new EU accession countries.
Such an optimistic view was (and is) obviously founded on the idea that a lack
of physical capital, which can fairly easily be overturned, is at the heart of the fairly
large differences in the standard of living between new and old EU members. However,
as the East German experience since unification shows, physical capital accumulation
does not appear to be the decisive bottleneck for faster economic convergence to the
West German level. The same may hold for many new EU accession countries.
More generally, the prospects for EU enlargement probably in more waves in
the near future have refocused research interests on the likely growth effects of
membership in the accession countries. This empirical interest coincides with the
renewed interest in the theory of economic growth. Unfortunately, many new growth
models do not identify a clear-cut set of factors which determine growth, or are more or
less resistant to empirical applications. Hence new member countries are confronted
with a wide array of theoretically consistent, but empirically unknown and sometimes
even conflicting implications for economic policies aiming at realizing all potential
growth effects of EU membership.
2In terms of neoclassical growth theory, which has remained the workhorse for
empirical growth research, EU accession means that new members can settle on a
steeper convergence path that would not be achievable otherwise. According to this
theory, the higher rate of convergence would result from an improved standing as a
borrower on international capital markets due to EU accession. Faster convergence
would mean a higher present value of future incomes and hence a higher average
growth rate until the steady state is reached. But this theory does not necessarily suggest
that all countries should converge to the same steady state, as long as there are
differences in technology and preferences across countries. For instance, some countries
may de facto restrict foreign direct investment due to linguistic or cultural barriers in
one way or another and hence may not have access to the latest technologies. Other
countries may have low savings and investment rates because of a weak institutional
enforcement of property rights as experienced under a long period of socialist planning.
In the long run, such differences should clearly diminish under a common set of EU
institutions, but in the short to medium run substantial differences are likely to remain
across countries with different economic and political histories.
An important implication of neoclassical growth theory is that subsidized capital
flows distributed to new members through various EU funds should not be
misunderstood as the main benefits of EU integration. Subsidized capital flows tend to
compensate for perceived differences in technology and capital accumulation between
new and old EU members without changing the underlying set of incentives and
preferences which gives rise to these differences in the first place. As long as
differences in technology and preferences remain, steady states will also continue to
differ. Large scale transfers, as in the case of East Germany, could actually reinforce
existing structural differences and create incentives that could lead to the emergence of
a second Mezzogiorno (Sinn and Westermann 2001). In a similar way, new member
countries may converge to a steady state which lies below the present EU average,
depending on the magnitude of the remaining cultural and political differences which
may show up as institutional ambiguities, at least in the short run.
The East German experience with EU membership (after unification in 1990)
probably comes close to what might be called a controlled experiment for assessing the
growth effects of EU membership. This is because East Germany received not only a
complete set of institutions appropriate to advanced industrial countries, but also access
to experienced administrators to run those institutions. Apart from having gained free
trade access throughout Europe, a legal system with a body of commercial law, a system
of property rights, and a set of courts, a social system including unemployment
compensation and a pension system with immediate entitlements for qualified
recipients, a hard currency, a system of public finance, a banking system with branches
that opened virtually immediately after unification, decentralized government authority,
accounting systems, and strong democratic political parties were among the institutions
imported (Dornbusch and Wolf, 1992).
What helped the introduction of these institutions were two special factors which
will not apply in the case of new member countries. One is that unification created a
legal union and so dispensed with the sovereignty issue that usually inhibits the
complete import of institutions. Hence in the case of German unification, it would
appear difficult to blame institutional ambiguities for presumed technological deficits or
low saving and investment rates. The other is that a common institutional history
3implied that institutions new to East Germany could nevertheless built on existing
structures in many cases. Hence what might be called cultural differences also appears
to be second order.
Notwithstanding these rather unique favorable starting conditions, high-flying
expectations have been disappointed so far. Labor productivity in East Germany has
reached about 60 percent of the West German level after ten years of EU membership.
This is up from much lower levels in the early 1990s, but convergence of labor
productivity and wages between East and West Germany has slowed down since the
mid 1990s and completely faded out recently.
The rather dismal growth and convergence effects of East German EU
membership are all the more remarkable just because East Germany could rely on the
tried and tested rules and institutions of the West German social market economy. So
the lack of fast convergence cannot be blamed on institutional insecurities, as might be
the case for other potential member countries. In addition, East Germany had immediate
access to large amounts of financial resources in the form of public transfers. Net
resource inflows in the range of more than 40 percent of East German GDP in
combination with an effective institutional framework should have generated very
positive conditions for growth and convergence. Similar starting conditions will not be
available for other accession countries.
A verdict on the growth performance of the East German economy in the first
decade of EU membership requires a measure of reference. The problem with any
empirical evaluation is that there are only ten years of observations, but several potential
factors which contribute to enhancing and limiting economic performance. Hence
econometric estimation is not feasible to account for the East German economic record.
The alternative is to use a simple neoclassical growth model, which can be
parameterized to predict a growth rate depending on initial conditions and on observed
rates of factor accumulation. By comparing the predicted growth rate with the actual
growth rate, such a simulation approach should reveal which factors of production may
be responsible for the so far missing East German convergence to West German
productivity levels.
To provide some conceptual background, Section II briefly summarizes recent
developments in the theory of economic growth with a focus on the issue of
convergence. Section III reviews stylized facts of the growth performance of the East
German economy after unification and EU membership. Section IV presents an open-
economy growth model that allows for partial capital mobility (Section IV), because
large capital inflows are generally held to be one of the major determinants of the
expected growth effects of EU membership.
Based on this model, Section V constructs a measure of reference against which
the actual performance of the East German economy can be evaluated. The model
predicts the level and the growth effects of convergence for the East German economy,
based on its initially low level of productivity and based on its observed (or implied)
rates of investment in physical and human capital, thereby assuming stable institutions
(including a stable currency) and open goods and capital markets. Ignoring the very first
years after unification, the theoretically predicted growth rate for the period 1993-2000
exceeds the observed growth rate by an order of magnitude.
4Given that institutional and technological differences are not responsible for the
failure of the model to account correctly for the relative East German growth rate, and
since physical capital accumulation in East Germany presently exceeds the West
German rate, reconciling the theoretical growth rate with the actual growth rate implies
that the East German stock of human capital per worker is the main culprit. Human
capital per worker is apparently much smaller than would be suggested by measures
such as average years of formal education of the workforce. With a lower stock of
human capital per worker than commonly presumed, the East German economy should
converge to a lower steady state level of output per worker than the West German
economy. This conclusion simply follows from the parameterization of the model,
which assumes identical institutions and identical production technologies. Any
evaluation of the plausibility of the identified deficiency in human capital has, therefore,
to be compared against implementing alternative assumptions regarding institutions and
technology.
In so far as the term institutions would also include the actual pattern of behavior
of economic agents when confronted with a given constraint, there might still be
important differences between East and West Germany that could simply reflect the
legacy of 40 years of socialism that may persist for some time. But even so, it might be
more helpful to call such differences, especially in the case of East Germany, a human
capital gap rather than an institutional or a technological gap. The problem for any
empirical assessment of the East German productivity record is that we may have fairly
accurate measures of output and (probably) physical capital, but we certainly do not
have any convincing measures of institutional differences, technological differences,
and human capital differences. Previous studies have mainly ignored the possibility that
measures of formal education may provide strongly misleading indicators of East
Germany’s stock of human capital. So these studies tend to overestimate the long-run
possibilities for productivity growth and convergence.
This is even true for the assessment by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), which
was held to be extremely pessimistic at the time. Using their empirical estimate of a
constant rate of convergence of 2 percent, which was based on a neoclassical growth
model in the tradition of Solow (1956), they predicted that East Germany, when starting
at about 50 percent of the West German productivity level after unification, would
initially grow by only about 1.4 percentage points (the product of the convergence rate
and the log of the initial productivity level) faster than the West German economy, with
the growth differential narrowing as East Germany would be catching up. This would
imply a rather slow catching up process with a half-life of about 35 years meaning that
it would take 35 years until the East German economy would half reached 75 percent of
the West German productivity level. Nevertheless, their prediction implies that in the
long run, finally, the same steady state would be reached.
Dornbusch and Wolf (1992) provide variations of the same theme by noting that
the initial income gap may have been closer to 70 percent than to 50 percent, which
results in an initial growth differential of 2.4 percentage points. In addition, they note
that allowing for a relatively high rate of physical investment may further increase the
speed of convergence between East and West Germany. Yet the logic of the underlying
growth model still suggests that catching up will be slow. Starting from an initial gap of
70 percent and by assuming the most favorable examples of investment-led catching up
5processes known from the historical record, East Germany would still need almost three
decades to achieve 80 percent of West Germany’s productivity level.
Using simple arithmetic rather than a growth model, Hughes Hallet and Ma
(1993), for instance, also demonstrate that given past experience a rather long period of
East German catching up could be expected. The rapid development of West Germany
under the Marshall plan, or of some East Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s,
produced sustained productivity growth rates averaging 6 to 7 percent at most. With
East Germany starting at about 30 percent of the West German productivity level, full
convergence within, say, 20 years would require the East German productivity growth 6
percentage points higher than in West Germany. By this measure, a period of 30 to 40
years to achieve convergence looks like a very optimistic assessment.
Boltho et al. (1997) confirm a more optimistic assessment based on their
empirical results for the East German manufacturing sector. They report that physical
capital investment has spurred productivity growth and hence catching up. They find
that East German productivity is higher relative to that in West Germany in those
manufacturing industries in which cumulative investment per employee has been the
highest. They argue that prospects for a full catching up of East Germany are promising
given that investment continues to be encouraged.
Funke and Strulik (2000) also point to a more optimistic outcome. They set up a
two-region endogenous growth model that emphasizes the role of private and public
capital accumulation during the catch up process. To assess the speed of convergence,
they calibrate their model with German data, thereby including the large-scale
interregional transfers. Their simulation results suggest that East Germany could reach
80 percent of West Germany’s productivity level between 20 and 30 years after
unification.
Focusing on the early period after unification, Keller (2000) estimates that
relatively high technical progress in East Germany can explain almost all of the catch up
with West Germany in 1991-1996. He emphasizes that the level of domestic innovative
activity as well as the extent of international technology diffusion appear to be the main
reasons for this. He concludes that ignoring potential East-West differences in the
conventionally measured rate of total factor productivity may lead to underestimating
the prospects for convergence and hence to an overly pessimistic assessment of East
Germany’s future similar to that of Italy’ Mezzogiorno. His analysis suggests that East
Germany could reach about 75 percent of the West German productivity level in a
period of 20 years.
The problem is that much of the observed productivity dynamics of the East
German economy has faded since 1996. Therefore, it is not surprising that the notion of
a German Mezzogiorno has become more popular recently (Sinn and Westermann
2001). Another problem is that all studies referred to completely ignore that human
capital deficiencies may play an important role. Barrel and te Velde (2000) at least
mention in their conclusions that the problem of further convergence may be embedded
in the stock of East Germany’s human capital. They show that equations including both
exogenous and endogenous technical progress are able to explain some of the initial
convergence of productivity levels. However, they also note that the convergence
process slowed in the late 1990s as privatizations were completed, which before helped
to establish the transfer of technology and organizational structure from West German
6and foreign firms. Hence they conclude that investment in human capital remains the
only way to improve the stock of knowledge in the East German economy.
While it is certainly much too early to draw final conclusions about the future
prospects for catching up and convergence of the East German economy, the possibility
that human capital rather than physical capital seems to be the decisive bottleneck
should dampen overly optimistic growth expectations of EU membership in the present
group of accession countries. Especially Central European countries, like East Germany
before, display measures of average years of schooling which sometimes even exceed
the EU average. However, the simulations presented in this paper suggest that East
Germany’s stock of human capital per worker may turn out to be only one third of West
Germany’s stock of human capital per worker. These simulation results should be a
warning not to take too seriously existing measures of formal education as appropriate
proxies for the economically relevant stock of human capital.
Taking the simulation results at face value, the question immediately arises how
the presumed human capital deficiency could be eliminated. Section VI concludes that
raising the stock of human capital is more difficult than raising the stock of physical
capital. Improving the quality of schooling should be an appropriate long-run strategy to
raise the steady state level of output per worker, but recent empirical research suggests
that merely raising public educational expenditures will probably not produce the
expected outcome. In the short run, active labor market policies like the retraining of
unemployed workers have been tried on a large scale, but with apparently little success
so far. Hence the main lesson from the East German experience for other EU accession
countries is that catching up may come to a halt below the EU average because the
economically relevant stock of human capital cannot be increased as easily as the stock
of physical capital, even under pretty favorable institutional and financial conditions.
II. Growth and Convergence: A Non-Technical Primer
About 15 years ago, the issue of economic growth returned to the center of
macroeconomic research. New aggregate data sets for a larger number of countries
became available (Summers and Heston 1984), and new theoretical insights led to what
is now called new growth theory. New growth theories focus on the modeling of
external effects in the presence of perfect competition and on the causes of
technological change, which both were neglected before. The empirics of growth did
not keep up with the theoretical advances. At present, growth theory is still ahead of
empirics, where the traditional neoclassical growth model serves as the workhorse of
almost all applied analyses.
In a sense, empirical research on growth may be summarized as the search for
the weak spots in neoclassical growth models in the tradition of Solow (1956). Using
the two factor inputs "capital" and "labor", the Solow model could neither convincingly
explain the large international differences in per capita income nor the large
international differences in growth rates. As a result of the seeming empirical failure of
the Solow model, Lucas (1988) and Romer (1989) argued that there was a need for
alternative growth models which could explain where growth comes from and why it
may persistently differ across countries. The new growth models claimed to offer
answers to both questions.
7The main reason for the initial attractiveness of the new growth models resulted
from a convincing explanation for the missing systematic catching up of poor
economies, not to speak of international convergence of output per worker. For given
parameterizations of preferences and technology, catching up and convergence should
result if the rate of return tends to decline with higher levels of factor accumulation. A
declining rate of return would reduce the growth rate predicted by the Solow model
until the economy reaches its steady state, where the growth rate should equal the
(exogenous) rate of technical progress. By implication, an economy far away from its
steady state should grow faster than an economy close to its steady state.
According to this logic, poor countries should grow faster than rich countries
because they have accumulated less capital and are, therefore, further away from their
steady state. Selected developing countries, notably in East and Southeast Asia, have in
fact grown much faster on average than many industrialized countries over the last
decades, notwithstanding the financial crisis of the late 1990s. But for the world
economy as a whole, a systematic catching up of poor economies is missing.
This is exactly what some of the new growth models predict. They assume that
rising levels of factor accumulation would not reduce the rate of return and, therefore,
would not reduce the rate of growth. According to this view, poor economies would
only be able to catch up if they persistently achieved a higher rate of investment than the
rich economies. But in contrast to the traditional model, there is no incentive to do so as
long as the rate of return remains high in rich countries. Hence convergence may occur
under certain conditions, but is not predicted as a regularity. So it seems tempting to
explain the so far missing convergence of East Germany on the basis of a new growth
model.
Yet the new models’ claim to provide a better account of the facts did not remain
unchallenged for long. First, the robustness of the model implications was doubted for
theoretical reasons. For instance, Solow (1994), Sheshinsky (1997), and Jones (1997)
noted that the growth implications of the new models tend to depend on a single
parameter, which has to take on a specific value to prevent the model from exploding or
from falling back to the traditional Solow case. Since there is nothing within the models
which would guarantee a specific value of the critical parameter, one could view the
new approaches as merely substituting one exogenous factor for another. Moreover, all
new growth models relying in one way or another on the diffusion of knowledge as the
engine of growth would face the same difficulty in explaining long-run differences in
cross-country growth as the Solow model.
Second, the new models were also shown to be less convincing empirically than
initially presumed. For instance, so-called R&D growth models suggest that the growth
rate of an economy should rise with its expenditures on basic research and development.
Such expenditures have in fact risen in OECD countries over the last 30 years or so, but
their growth rates tend to have declined as observed by Jones (1995). In addition,
different econometric time series techniques were shown to produce inconclusive results
with regard to convergence, so the available data obviously do not answer the question
which kind of growth model has to be preferred (Gundlach 1993).
Along with the proliferation of new growth models over the last decade, the
empirically motivated critique of the Solow model also generated a research program
looking for possible theoretical improvements of the Solow approach while at the same
8time preserving its empirical accessibility. This research program proved to be
successful in so far as international differences in growth rates could be explained as
reflecting transitional dynamics, i.e. as a fairly slow adjustment of each economy to its
own steady state. This come back of the Solow model in a different form has been
labeled "neoclassical revival" (Topel 1998).
The neoclassical revival does not mean that the last word is spoken in the theory
and the empirics of growth. For instance, a better theory of total factor productivity
growth or of technical progress is certainly needed for convincing explanations of the
mere existence of growth and probably also for more insightful explanations of
persistent differences in growth rates, as argued by Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and Prescott (1998). But for the topic of this paper, a model
which tries to explain observed differences in growth rates as reflecting different
distances from a common steady state seems to provide a most reasonable starting point.
After all, EU integration is meant to adopt a common set of laws, social norms, and
institutions. Without any apparent reason why technology should not flow freely within
the EU (or within Germany, for that matter) and given that factor mobility prevails, a
convergence of income levels should result at least in the long run.
The model to be used in the next section avoids some of the often-noted weak
spots of neoclassical growth theory in the tradition of the Solow model. First of all,
human capital is considered as a third factor of production. In their seminal paper,
Mankiw et al. (1992) showed that a human capital augmented Solow model does a good
job in explaining international differences in the level of output per worker and in the
average growth rate of output per worker. One implication of the augmented growth
model is that it predicts a much lower rate of convergence to the steady state than the
original Solow model if human capital accounts for a share of factor income which is at
least as large as the share of physical capital. With a broad capital share of about 80
percent, the augmented model would predict a rate of convergence to the steady state of
about 2 percent, as shown in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). Since many empirical
studies have in fact confirmed an empirical rate of convergence of about 2 percent, this
stylized fact is sometimes called "Barro’s Law".1
Introducing human capital as a third factor of production into the Solow model
reconciled theoretical predictions of the rate of convergence with empirical evidence,
but it immediately generated a new theoretical problem. The augmented Solow model
only provides a plausible theoretical rationale for a slow rate of convergence if capital is
perfectly immobile across economies. With high capital mobility, as is observed within
the European Union and especially within the United States, the rate of convergence
should be much higher than just two percent. In a fully integrated capital market, the
speed of convergence should actually be infinitely high according to the logic of the
augmented Solow model. With no restrictions on capital flows, each economy (each US
state, for that matter) should immediately jump to its steady state output level. But this
obviously does not happen: the rate of convergence across US states was also found to
be about 2 percent (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).
To solve this problem, Barro et al. (1995) suggested to allow for partial mobility
of capital only. Their model assumes that physical capital can be financed by external
                                                
1
 See Sala-i-Martin (1996) for a survey of the empirical literature on convergence.
9borrowing because it can serve as collateral, but human capital must be financed by
domestic savings. If the amount of external debt that can be accumulated is constrained
by the size of the domestic capital stock, the augmented Solow model again predicts a
rate of convergence both with and without capital mobility in the range of 2 percent.
Hence the augmented Solow model with partial capital mobility can account for the
international and interregional evidence on convergence.
Just because the rate of convergence appears to be rather low, the model can be
used for economic policy considerations focusing on growth. If the rate of convergence
were high, the model economy would be predicted to be always close to its steady state
where changes in factor accumulation - investment in physical and in human capital -
would only affect the level of output per worker, but not the growth rate. But if the rate
of convergence is actually low, higher investment in physical and human capital will
raise the growth rate for a relatively long time period. Not least because of these
features, the augmented Solow model with partial capital mobility seems to provide an
appropriate measure of reference for evaluating East Germany’s record on growth and
convergence.2
III. Output and Factor Input in East Germany after Unification:
Some Stylized Facts
One year after unification, East Germany’s GDP per working-age person was
estimated to be about one third of the West German level. It roughly doubled over the
following five years but has remained at a level of about 60 percent of the West German
level ever since (Figure 1). These simple facts can be interpreted from two perspectives.
East Germany’s productivity record certainly is a success story compared to many other
transition economies, where the initial fall in output has been much larger and the
subsequent recovery has been much smaller (Fischer and Sahay 2000). But by
comparing East and West Germany’s level of labor productivity, it turns out that not
everything is well. Given that there are no limitations in factor mobility and capital
flows, it would be reasonable to predict a gradual and probably fast process of
convergence of labor productivity. But this does not seem to happen, at least not as fast
as was initially expected. The question is why.
In terms of basic growth models, the perceived lack of convergence may reflect
inherent differences in capital accumulation which persist at least in the medium run
despite unlimited capital mobility. However, differences in physical capital
accumulation do not appear to be a major part of the story. Figure 2 shows that overall
investment per working-age person has been up to 50 percent higher in East Germany
than in West Germany since 1993. Equipment investment has fallen below the West
German level recently but also remains quite high. If anything, total investment in
physical capital per working-age person is higher in East Germany than in West
Germany. Together with the evidence for the level of labor productivity reported in
Figure 1, this implies that investment as a share of GDP (I/Y) is about twice as high in
East Germany than in West Germany, just because
                                                
2
 See Barbone and Zalduendo (1997) for an econometric estimation of the closed economy
Solow model and an assessment of the potential EU Accession of Central and Eastern Europe.
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(1) I Y I L Y L/ ( / ) / ( / )=   ,
where I/L is investment per working-age person (which is set to 120 percent) and Y/L is
GDP per working-age person (which is set to 60 percent). Taken at face value, this
should have generated very favorable conditions for convergence.
Figure 1 — GDP per Working-age Person in East Germany, 1991–1999a
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Source: Sinn (2000).
Figure 2 — Investment per Working-age Person in East Germany, 1991–1999a
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Source: Sinn (2000).
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One reason for concern is that the resources invested are only partly generated
by the East German economy itself, as can be seen from the structure of absorption.
There has been a large net resource inflow which amounted to more than 30 percent of
total absorption in 1999 (Figure 3). Hence every third Deutsche Mark spent in East
Germany came from the West. This means that the net resource inflow from abroad,
which could be considered to equal to East Germany’s fictitious trade deficit (goods and
services) with West Germany, accounted for 46 percent of the East German GDP in
1999.
Figure 3 — The Structure of Absorption of the East German Economy, 1999
Private capital 
flows
10,1%
Public transfers
21,4%Gross Domestic 
Product
68,5%
Source: Sinn (2000).
About two thirds of the net resource inflow is financed by public transfers, and
one third by private capital flows. More than half of the transfers is for social security
payments and only 12 percent is for investment in public infrastructure (Sinn 2000).
Private capital inflows not only include direct investment in plant and equipment, but
also business loans and public loans. Hence the relatively high figure for private capital
flows, which amounts to 15 percent of the East German GDP, does not necessarily
reflect excellent investment opportunities but is at least partly due to borrowing by the
East German Länder and municipalities (Gemeinden).
To put East Germany's net resource inflow into perspective, Figure 4 lists other
transition economies and selected EU member countries in descending order of their
trade balance. The size of East Germany's trade deficit in the range of 45 percent of its
GDP appears to be rather unique, not only compared to the countries listed in Figure 4.
Except for Armenia, there seems to be no other economy around the world which
manages to run a trade deficit that large. And if economic history is any guide, trade
deficits larger than 10 percent of GDP are most likely to be unsustainable. This may be
different in this special case, but there are some doubts whether the current size of the
12
West-East resource transfer could go on forever. If not, East German consumption
would have to decline in order to maintain a high rate of capital accumulation.
Figure 4 — East Germany's “Trade Deficit” in Perspectivea
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Greece
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Slovak Republic
East Germany
aFor East Germany: public transfers and private capital flows from West Germany in
percent of East Germany’s GDP, 1999; for all other countries: difference between
exports and imports of goods and services in percent of GDP (negative values indicate
net resource inflows), 1997.
Source: Figure 3 and World Bank (2000).
At present, East Germany’s trade deficit looks more like an import share of a
small open economy. The by and large missing East German export sector is actually
one of the major differences between East and West Germany. One reason for the
missing export share is that the East German manufacturing sector drastically declined
in the first two years after unification, when labor costs exploded due to a centralized
system of wage bargaining between labor unions and employer organizations that was
imported from the West. This system of wage bargaining aimed a fast convergence
between East and West German wage levels without considering differences in
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productivity and without taking into account the resulting unemployment in East
Germany, which is more than twice as high on average than in the West.
One consequence of the introduction of the administered fast convergence of
East German wages has been that the East German capital stock could not be adjusted
gradually to shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production while at the same
time maintaining a high level of employment. The wage explosion caused a large
economic destruction of the existing stock of physical capital and a large decline in
employment, especially in manufacturing. Since a large wage gap between East and
West Germany was held to be unacceptable for political and social reasons, despite a
large gap in productivity, capital formation was highly subsidized especially until the
end of 1996 in order to generate the investment necessary for the process of
transformation and convergence.
Until about 1994, high investment rates did not translate into a fast growing
stock of capital per worker because of the high depreciation rates which reflected the
economic decline of the existing stock of capital. Disaggregated data for selected
industries show that East Germany had a relatively low stock of physical capital per
person relative to West Germany in 1994, especially in manufacturing and in services
(Figure 5). The total capital intensity was estimated to be about 38 percent of the West
German level. Together with the data on labor productivity from Figure 1, these figures
suggest that the capital-output ratio in East Germany was also lower than in West
Germany in 1994,3 just because
(2) K Y K L Y L/ ( / ) / ( / )=   ,
where K/Y is the capital output ratio, K/L is capital stock per person (capital intensity),
and Y/L is GDP per working-age person.
But this has changed once the highly subsidized investment activities in East
Germany actually generated a net increase in the stock of capital after 1994, and
especially so in manufacturing which had experienced the largest economic decline of
all sectors. The manufacturing sector which has emerged under these conditions
operates at a relatively high capital-output ratio. Figure 6 actually shows that with only
one exception,4 all East German manufacturing industries display a higher capital-
output ratio than their West German counterparts. A linear regression of the East
German capital-output ratio on the West-German capital-output ratio, which is forced to
run through the origin, produces a statistically significant slope coefficient of 3.1 and an
adjusted R squared of 67 percent. Hence the capital-output ratio in manufacturing in
East Germany was about two hundred percent higher than in West Germany in 1997.
                                                
3
 The data from Figures 1 and 5 cannot be directly compared because they refer to different
denominators, namely working-age persons (Fig.1) and all persons living in the respective area
(Fig.5) but are nevertheless instructive for a qualitative assessment.
4
 The exception is precision engineering. In this industry, East Germany hosted some of the
most productive European firms before the second world war.
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Figure 5 — Capital Stock per Person in East Germany, 1994a
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Source: DIW (1995).
Figure 6 — Capital-Output Ratio Across Manufacturing Industriesa, 1997
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Capital intensity divided by labor productivity; 19 two-digit industries. Data on capital
intensity and labor productivity taken from DIW et al. (1999).
Source: DIW et al. (1999), own calculations.
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For the total East German economy, the capital stock per person employed was
estimated to be about 76 percent of the West German level in 1998 (Ragnitz 1999). This
number is not directly comparable with the data on labor productivity in Figure 1, which
refer in the denominator to working-age persons rather than persons employed.
Nevertheless, this estimate seems to suggest that the aggregate capital-output ratio is
higher in East Germany than in West Germany. This follows because output per person
employed in East Germany, like output per working-age person, reached about 60
percent of the West German level in 1997. The reason for the similarity of these figures
is that higher East German unemployment is compensated for by higher East German
labor force participation. So the best guess is that the aggregate East German capital-
output ratio was about 30 percent higher than in West Germany in 1998.
Notwithstanding possible reservations about the precise magnitudes of the
capital stock estimates, which probably do not adequately reflect the specific conditions
prevailing in the early phases of transition, the overall impression one gets is that
lacking physical capital accumulation cannot be considered as the major problem for the
missing convergence of the East German economy. The simple fact remains that even in
manufacturing, where substantially more physical capital is now used per unit of output
than in the West, labor productivity on average did not exceed two thirds of the West
German level in 1998 (DIW et al. 1999). That is, if physical capital deficiencies do not
turn out to be the decisive bottleneck for fast convergence, human capital deficiencies
may provide a much better explanation.
For other transition economies, it may also be reasonable to hypothesize that
human capital deficiencies are an important part of the story. But if this is actually the
case it will be much harder to prove than in the case of East Germany. What makes the
East German case very special is that institutional differences or technological
differences cannot easily be blamed for the missing convergence, as argued in Section I.
With unification, East Germany could adopt the tried-and-tested institutional framework
of the West German economy. This framework may not be optimal. For instance, a less
complicated legal system or somewhat less stringent conditions for construction permits
might have been more suitable for rapid transition (Dornbusch and Wolf 1992), and the
imposed system of centralized wage bargaining has proved to be a liability. But on
balance, it seems that the possibility to import and immediately implement West
German institutions was an asset. Had East Germany tried to create its own set of
institutions, as other transition economies have to at least to some extent, results would
most likely be worse. Since it did not, having the same set of institutions should lead to
the same long-run steady state in the East and the West, given that there are no
persistent differences in preferences regarding saving and investment. Similarly, with
full capital mobility after unification, there is no reason to believe that the East would be
somehow cut off from the technologies used in the West.
While institutional differences may persist for some time after accession in case
of new EU members for, say, historical, legal, cultural, or linguistic reasons, such
differences cannot matter much in case of East Germany. Unification not only brought
the same currency and the same legal framework, it also meant immediate integration
into the same social infrastructure including, for instance, the health system, the
education system, the pension system, and the unemployment insurance system. Hence
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from the macro-perspective of a growth model, differences in the quality of the
workforce remain as the most plausible reason for the persisting differences in output
per working-age person once differences in institutions, technology, and physical capital
accumulation are obviously small or do not exist at all.
Unfortunately, very little direct information exists on the relative quality of the
East German and the West German workforce. And the evidence that exists sometimes
points to different conclusions. For instance, average years of education in the
population aged 25 and over were higher in East Germany by about 10 percent than in
West Germany in 1990, as reported by Barro and Lee (2000). Wagner (1993) points out
that formal training levels across manufacturing industries are higher in East Germany
than in West Germany. Given that there were actually no severe differences in the
formal qualification of the workforce, and especially no deficiencies on the eastern side,
informal qualification levels could be expected to converge quickly once East German
workers are completely integrated into market-oriented production structures.
However, measures of formal schooling and training may only allow for a
partial picture of the economically relevant stock of human capital as long as the
economic return to education and the relative quality of education produced by different
educational systems are not taken into account (Gundlach et al. forthcoming). The brain
drain that occurred in the early years after unification also seems to indicate that
probably some of the most motivated (young) and most productive (skilled) workers
have left the East German labor force. Hence it may be no coincidence that the share of
employees with tertiary education declined in East German manufacturing from 35.5
percent to 30 percent in 1991-1998 while it rose from 30.8 percent to 36 percent in West
German manufacturing over the same time period (Klodt 2000).
Taken together, the following stylized facts about output and factor input of the
East German economy after unification emerge. Labor productivity doubled from 30
percent of the West German level to about 60 percent within five years but has
remained at about that level ever since. Physical capital accumulation appears to be
strong: investment as a share of GDP and the capital-output ratio are higher than in
West Germany and there is a large net resource inflow. Whether human capital input is
also strong cannot be decided on the basis of the available data. In the next section, I
present a neoclassical model of growth and convergence in order to simulate the implied
level and growth effects of convergence on the basis of the available input data. Given
that the observed productivity gap and the amount of physical capital accumulation is
correctly measured relative to West Germany, such a model can also be used to reveal a
hypothetical relative stock of human capital. Such an assessment may be especially
relevant for other transition economies with a high level of formal education of the
workforce.
IV. A Model of Growth and Convergence with Partial Capital
Mobility
In the augmented Solow model with partial capital mobility of Barro et al.
(1995), output is produced with four factors: physical capital, human capital, raw labor,
and technology. Thus, assuming that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
(3) Y K H AL= − −α η α η( )1   ,
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where Y is output, K is the stock of physical capital, H is the stock of human capital, L is
the quantity of raw labor, A is the level of technology, and α and η  are production
elasticities which resemble the shares of physical and human capital in factor income
(with α η+ <1). Raw labor grows at the constant, exogenous rate n, and g is the
constant, exogenous rate of labor augmenting technological change with
A t A eg t( ) ( )= ⋅0 .
With perfect capital mobility and unlimited abilities to borrow on the
international capital market, a small open economy (like Eastern Germany after
unification) should jump instantaneously to its steady state levels of output, physical
capital, and human capital according to the logic of the model. To avoid the implication
of an infinite speed of convergence, Barro et al. (1995) assume that the amount of
external debt which a country accumulates is constrained by the quantity of its capital
stock that can be used as collateral for international borrowing. Hence in the model,
physical capital is partially mobile across economies because it can be used as
collateral, while human capital is completely immobile and has to be financed entirely
by domestic savings. Human capital in fact seems to be more or less immobile across
East and West Germany since there has been almost no net East-West migration in
recent years (Hunt 2000).
Barro et al. (1995) show that the open economy with partial physical capital
mobility works like a closed economy with a broad capital share that is less than
α η+ . In the open economy case, the possibility of external borrowing (limited by the
size of the domestic capital stock K) allows for a relatively fast accumulation of
physical capital. Therefore, the open economy displays a higher rate of convergence
than the closed economy. Even though the difference in convergence rates turns out to
be small for a standard parameterization of technology and preferences, open economies
are predicted to reach their steady state earlier than closed economies. Hence partial
physical capital mobility allows for a higher present value of all accumulated future
output flows compared to a situation without capital mobility.
At this point it is worth emphasizing that the convergence rate should not be
confused with the actual growth rate of an economy. The convergence rate depends on a
set of technology and preference parameters which tend to be similar across economies
(see equation (21) in Section V). Therefore, the rate of convergence may be the same
for different economies, as is assumed in the empirical convergence literature beginning
with Mankiw et al. (1992). By contrast, the actual growth rate of an economy depends
on the initial distance from the steady state and on the level of the variables determining
the steady state. In the empirical growth literature, a clear distinction between the rate of
convergence and the actual growth rate of an economy is sometimes missing.
Figure 7 shows the transition path of an economy starting below its steady state
level of output. The transition path is entirely determined by the constant rate of
convergence, which measures the speed at which an economy gradually approaches its
steady state. A slightly higher rate of convergence, as would be the case with partial
capital mobility compared to complete capital immobility, implies a steeper transition
path. For a given steady state, a higher rate of convergence would mean a higher rate of
growth, but for a given rate of convergence the growth rate would be entirely
determined by the distance from the steady state.
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Figure 7 - Convergence and Accumulated Output
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The shaded area below the transition path represents the output which is
accumulated in the transition to the steady state. Hence knowing the rate of convergence
of an economy and its initial distance from the steady state, it becomes possible to
calculate the present value of the accumulated output flows, as shown by Gundlach and
Diehl (1999). The present value (PV) of output growth which results from convergence
to the steady state is given by
(4) ( ) ( )( )PV
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where r is the steady-state real interest rate, y(t) is output at time t, and y(0) is initial
output, with y yt > 0 . As is customary in the growth literature, output is measured in
units of effective labor ( )y Y AL≡ / . Dividing both sides by ( )y 0  and using the log-
approximation ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
y t y
y
y t y− ≅ −0
0
0log log , it follows that
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The second term of the right-hand-side can be substituted for an expression
which describes the transition dynamics of the economy around the steady state.
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that the transition dynamics around the steady state evolves
according to
(6) ( ) ( ) ( )log log logy t e y e yt t= − ∗ +− −1 0β β   ,
where β  is the rate of convergence and y∗  is the steady-state income. Subtracting
( )log y 0  from both sides gives
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )log log log * logy t y e y yt− = − −−0 1 0β   ,
which can be substituted into equation (5):
(8) ( ) ( )( )PV
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Equation (8) can be arranged by using the summation rule for a geometric
progression given by γ γ
γ
t
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so the summation in equation (8) can be transformed to
(11) ( )( )PV
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Using the Taylor expansion of e−β  at β = 0  , i.e. for the convergence rate to
be a small number, it follows that e− ≅ −β β1  , and hence β β≅ − −1 e  . This result
simplifies equation (11) to
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Reversing the first log-approximation used to derive equation (5), one ends up
with
(13) ( )( )PV
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Equation (13) shows that the present value of the output accumulated during the
convergence to the steady state depends on three variables: the real interest rate, the
speed of the convergence towards to steady state, and the initial distance from the
steady state. All other things constant, the present value rises with a lower real interest
rate and increases with a higher convergence rate and a larger distance from the steady
state. Since the real interest rate and the convergence rate can be calculated as functions
of preference and technology parameters, equation (13) can be used to calculate the
present value of the output effect of convergence as a multiple of the initial output for a
given distance from the steady state (see Section V.1).
In addition to estimating the infinite level effect of convergence, the model also
predicts the impact of convergence on the growth rate of output per worker for a given
period of time and a given distance from the steady state. Rewriting equation (7) in
terms of output per worker gives
(14) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )log / log / log logY t L t Y L gt e y yt− = + − ∗ −−0 0 1 0β  ,
where Y/L is output per worker, y is output in efficiency units as before, t is time, and
( ) ( )A t A egt= 0 , so ( ) ( )( )log logA t A gt− =0 . To see what differences alternative
rates of factor accumulation may make, the steady state output y* can be proxied by its
determinants. As shown by Mankiw et al. (1992), deriving the steady state levels of
physical and human capital and substituting into the intensive form of the production
function (3), and taking logs, it follows that steady-state output per worker in efficiency
units is
(15) log( / )Y AL
=
− −
+
− −
−
+
− −
+ +
α
α η
η
α η
α η
α η
δ
1 1 1
log( ) log( ) log( )s s n gk h  ,
where δ  is the common rate of depreciation of physical and human capital, and sk  and
sh  are the (constant) fractions of output that are invested in physical and human capital.
Substituting equation (15) for y* in equation (14) results in
(16) ( ) ( )log ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( )Y t L t Y L− 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )= − − − − +
− −
+ +− −gt e y e n gt t1 0 1
1
β β α η
α η
δlog log( )
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which allows to account for the impact on the growth rate of alternative rates of factor
accumulation. This equation can be further transformed to estimate the impact on
growth of alternative levels of human capital
(17) ( ) ( )log ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( )Y t L t Y L− 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )= − − − −
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log( ) log( ( ) / ( ))   ,
which differs in terms of the coefficients on the factor inputs from equation (16).
Alternatively, using the intensive form of the structural production function (3) rather
than the reduced form (15) to substitute for y* in equation (14), the impact on growth of
alternative levels of both factor inputs can be estimated as
(18) ( ) ( )log ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( )Y t L t Y L− 0 0
( ) ( )= − − −gt e yt1 0β log
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ − + −− −1 1e K t L t e H t L tt tβ βα ηlog ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( )   .
Given that the underlying growth theory suggests that the capital-output ratio K/Y rather
than the capital intensity K/L should remain constant in the steady state, K/L can be
substituted for K/Y which results in
(19) ( ) ( )log ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( )Y t L t Y L− 0 0
( ) ( )= − − −gt e yt1 0β log
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ −
−
+ −− −1
1
1e K t Y t e H t L tt tβ βα
α
η( ) log ( ) / ( ) log ( ) / ( ) ,
with a different coefficient on the human capital variable. The next section shows how
equations (13), (14), (17), and (19) can be used to derive quantitative estimates of the
level and growth effects of convergence by taking into account the empirical evidence
presented in Section III on the initial income level, the share of investment in GDP, the
amount of capital mobility, the capital-output ratio, and the stock of human capital.5
                                                
5
 Details of the calculations are available on request in the form of Lotus 1-2-3 worksheets.
22
V. Level and Growth Effects of Convergence for a Standard 
Parameterization of Preferences and Technology
1. The Level Effect of Convergence: Present Value of Output Gain
As a first step, I calculate the hypothetical level effect of convergence as
graphically shown in Figure 7 and quantitatively defined by equation (13). With an
initial East German labor productivity of 30 percent of the West German level, the
steady state gap indicated by the last term on the right-hand side of equation (13) equals
233 percent. To identify the real interest rate and the convergence rate required for a
calculation of the first and the second term of the right-hand-side of equation (13), a
standard parameterization of preferences and technology can be used.
First, the steady-state real interest rate equals the rate of time preference ρ  plus
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption θ  times the
rate of labor-augmenting technological change g:
(20) r g= +ρ θ   .
Barro et al. (1995) derive a real interest rate of 6 percent by assuming that θ
equals 2 (so the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals 0.5), and both ρ  and g
equal 2 percent. This real interest rate appears to fit with long-term averages of real
rates of return on the US stock market.
Second, Barro et al. (1995) derive the rate of convergence to the steady state as
(21) 2 ß ( ) ( )= + −  + + + + − + +



 −ϕ
ω
θ
δ ρ θ δ ρ θ
ω
δ ϕ2
1 2
4 1 g g n g
/
 ,
where ω  equals α η+  for the closed economy and ω  equals ( )η α/ 1−  for the
open economy, α  is the share of physical capital in factor income and η  is the share of
human capital in factor income (see also the production function (3)), δ  is the
depreciation rate of physical and human capital, n is the exogenous rate of population
growth, and ( )ϕ ρ θ= − − − >n g1 0 .
The difference between the convergence rates of the open and the closed
economy entirely hinges on ω , which reflects the assumption made about the amount
of capital that can serve as collateral for external borrowing. Barro et al. (1995) show
that the exponent on the broad capital-stock variable including physical and human
capital is ( )η α/ 1−  in the debt-constrained open economy rather than α η+  in the
closed economy.
If all capital constitutes collateral ( )η α= =0 1, , ω = 0  and equation (21)
would predict an infinite rate of convergence for an economy with capital stock k. This
case obviously does not apply in reality if a whole economy is concerned, but it may
provide a reasonable explanation for cases like the reconstruction after the Kobe
earthquake. If no capital constitutes collateral ( )α = 0 , ω η=  and equation (21)
would predict the rate of convergence of a closed economy with capital stock h. This
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case also does not apply for countries which become a member of an economic union
with access to the international capital market, as in the case of East Germany. If
external borrowing is constrained by the amount of physical capital that can serve as
collateral ( )α η α η> > + <0 0 1, , , ( )ω η α= −/ 1  and equation (21) predicts a
convergence rate for an economy with a broad capital stock h+k. This intermediate case
seems to be most appropriate for assessing East Germany’s hypothetical rate of
convergence after unification and EU membership, where the amount of net capital
inflows comes close to the typical factor share of physical capital in the range of 30
percent.
For a quantitative estimate of the rate of convergence, Barro et al. (1995) use
parameter values that seem reasonable for the US economy and other industrialized
countries. They assume factor shares of 30 percent for physical capital and 50 percent
for human capital based on results by Jorgenson et al. (1987). They further assume a
common depreciation rate for physical and human capital of 5 percent and a rate of
population growth of 1 percent. The assumptions regarding ρ , θ , and g are the same as
in the case of the real interest rate. Based on this parameterization, the convergence rate
of the open economy with partial physical capital mobility equals 2.23 percent, which is
less than one percentage point above the convergence rate of 1.43 percent of the closed
economy. Since the predicted difference between the two convergence rates appears to
be rather small, the chosen parameterization reconciles the predictions of the open-
economy neoclassical growth model with the empirical evidence on convergence rates
for economies with and without capital mobility (see Section II), as would be required
for assessing the growth performance of an economy which gained access to an
integrated capital market.
Table 1 shows the results for a simulation of the hypothetical output effect of the
convergence to the steady state. For the standard parameterization discussed above and
a zero growth rate of the population, the model suggests that the present value of the
output gain of convergence equals about 11 times the initial level of output (first row).
This result shows the large hypothetical output effects of convergence compared to a
situation without any convergence. Put differently, the potential benefits of joining an
economic union like the EU appear to be large given that is the only option for an
economy to establish credible institutions and access to the international capital market.
However, Table 1 also shows that the quantitative finding is sensitive to the
assumptions about the distance from the steady state, the degree of capital mobility, and
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (see the following rows). The predicted
present value of the output gain of convergence is much larger for countries starting
further away from the steady state and it is much smaller for countries starting closer to
the steady state. A lower degree of capital mobility, as modeled by a lower share of
physical capital in factor income, substantially reduces the predicted present value,
while a higher degree of capital mobility represented by the East German trade deficit of
about 45 percent (see Figure 4) increases the predicted present value. A lower
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which may be reasonably assumed for relatively
poor countries according to work by Ogaki and Atkeson (1997), reduces the predicted
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present value.6 Combining a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution with the high
degree of capital mobility observed for the case of East Germany still suggests that here
might be a large long run potential output gain of joining an economic union with
credible institutions and access to the world capital market, given that without joining
there would be no credible institutions and no capital mobility, and hence no
convergence.
Table 1 — Potential Output Effects of Convergencea
Initial output level Capital mobility
parameter
Intertemporal
elasticity of
substitution
Present value of
output gain
(multiple of initial
output level)
y(0) α 1 / θ PV
0.3 0.30 ½ 10.9
0.1 0.30 ½ 41.9
0.6 0.30 ½ 3.1
0.3 0.05 ½ 8.1
0.3 0.45 ½ 13.6
0.3 0.30 1/3 5.7
0.3 0.45 1/3 7.5
aParameter assumptions: ρ θ α η δ= = + = = = =0 02 2 0 8 0 05 0 02 0. , , . , . , . ,g n  .
2. Growth Effects of Absolute and Conditional Convergence
With the large potential long-run level effects of convergence, the question
arises which growth effects the underlying model would predict for shorter time
periods, such as the first ten years after German unification. Such an exercise can show
how close the actual East German growth record comes to the theoretical predictions.
Comparing the observed with the predicted growth rates thus provides an answer to the
question whether the East German record can be regarded as a success or as a failure up
to now.
Equation (14) describes the growth rate of an economy which starts below its
steady state. Given that the West German level of output per worker represents the
                                                
6
 As shown by Barro et al. (1995), assuming a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution (a
higherθ ) implies a lower broad saving rate which includes physical and human capital. If the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals 0.5, the implied saving rate would equal 36
percent for the standard parameterization of preferences and technology and a marginal tax rate
of 30 percent. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution falls to 0.33, the implied saving rate,
ceteris paribus, declines to 30 percent.
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relevant steady state for the East German economy, and given that the convergence rate
is determined by a standard parameterization of preferences and technology as before,
the predicted growth rate follows directly as a function of the initial steady state gap.
With initial East German labor productivity at 30 percent of the West German level and
a convergence rate of 2.15 percent, the East German economy should have grown on
average by 4.3 percent per year relative to the West German economy over the first ten
years after unification. In fact, it has grown on average by 6.9 percent per year relative
to West Germany since labor productivity doubled from 30 to 60 percent of the West
German level (Table 2, first row).7 Such a positive assessment of the actual East
German growth record does not change by much if the high amount of capital inflows is
taken into account by assuming a factor share of physical capital of 45 percent (rather
than 30 percent) in the calculation of the convergence rate. The convergence rate rises
to 3 percent (not shown) and the predicted growth rate is now 5.1 percent, which is still
substantially below the observed growth rate of 6.9 percent.
Table 2 — Growth Effects of Absolute Convergencea
Initial labor
productivity
Time period
(years)
Capital mobility
parameter
Predicted growth
rate
(percent)
Actual growth
rate
(percent)
Y L/ t α
0.3 10 0.30 4.3 6.9
0.3 10 0.45 5.1 6.9
0.5 7 0.30 3.4 2.6
0.5 7 0.45 3.9 2.6
aParameter assumptions: ρ θ α η δ= = + = = = =0 02 2 0 8 0 05 0 02 0. , , . , . , . ,g n .
The problem is that most of the East German catching up happened in the very
first years after unification. For instance, the East German economy reached 50 percent
of the West German level of labor productivity as soon as 1993. Hence considering the
growth record since 1993 provides a very different picture. The model would predict an
average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent for the first seven years after the economy
starts from a level of labor productivity which is 50 percent of its steady state level.
Taking account of the high capital imports, the predicted average annual growth rate
would rise to 3.9 percent. But the East German economy has only grown by 2.6 percent
on average in 1993-2000 (Table 2). So ignoring the first years of unification, the model
                                                
7
 In the following calculations, I assume for convenience that East German labor productivity
equals 60 percent of the West German level in 2000. The actual figure may turn out to be
somewhat lower.
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would suggest a disappointing growth and convergence record of the East German
economy.
An alternative interpretation would be to assume that the East German economy
converges to its own steady state, which could differ from the West German
productivity level as it may reflect a different set of preferences that are inherited from
40 years of socialist planning. Hence this kind of conditional convergence may be a
more appropriate concept for the short and medium run than the concept of absolute
convergence as discussed before. Equations (17) and (19) can be used to implement the
concept of conditional convergence for the case of the East German economy.
Section III has shown that investment as a share of GDP is about as twice as
high and that the aggregate capital-output ratio is about 1.3 times (and the
manufacturing capital-output ratio is about 3 times) higher in East Germany than in
West Germany, whereas the empirical evidence for the relative stock of human capital
appears to be inconclusive. Table 3 shows the results for the predicted average annual
growth rates (relative to West Germany), if the model economy starts at 50 percent of
its own steady state, which is determined by a higher investment share (first two lines of
Table 3) or alternatively by a higher capital-output ratio (relative to West Germany) as
reported in Section III. These results have to be compared with the actual East German
growth rate of output per worker, which was 2.6 percent per year in 1993-2000.
Table 3 — Growth Effects of Conditional Convergencea
Initial labor
productivity
Time
period
(years)
Capital mobility
parameter
Investment
share
Capital-output
ratio
Predicted
growth rate
(percent)
Y L/ t α I/GDP K/Y
0.5 7 0.30 2 - 4.0
0.5 7 0.45 2 - 4.6
0.5 7 0.30 - 1.3 3.6
0.5 7 0.45 - 1.3 4.2
0.5 7 0.30 - 3 4.3
0.5 7 0.45 - 3 5.1
aParameter assumptions: ρ θ α η δ= = + = = = =0 02 2 0 8 0 05 0 02 0. , , . , . , . ,g n .
In Table 3, the difference between the predicted growth rate and the actual
growth rate of 2.6 percent is larger than in Table 2. This simply follows from the logic
of the model which predicts that an economy with a higher sustainable investment share
and hence with a higher long-run capital-output ratio should, all other things constant,
display a higher average growth rate up to the steady state, especially in the short run.
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Hence assuming a lower relative East German stock of human capital, despite fairly
high levels of formal schooling and other formal training as noted in Section III,
emerges as the most obvious possibility to reconcile the predicted and the actual growth
rates.
Table 4 uses two ad hoc specifications of the relative East German stock of
human capital to simulate the predicted growth rate of a model economy starting from
50 percent of its steady-state level of labor productivity. Setting East Germany’s stock
of human capital per worker to 50 percent of the West German level (H/L=0.5)
apparently does not suffice to reconcile the predicted growth rate with the observed
growth rate for the parameterizations and specifications considered. But the model
predicts a growth rate close to 2.6 percent for 1993-2000 if the East German stock of
human capital is set to 30 percent of the West German level (H/L=0.3), given that either
the East German investment share is hundred percent higher (I/GDP=2) or the East
German capital-output ratio is 30 percent higher (K/Y=1.3) than in West Germany.
Table 4 — The Impact of Alternative Human Capital Stocks on the Growth 
Effect of Convergencea
Initial labor
productivity
Time
period
(years)
Capital
mobility
parameter
Human
capital
stock
Investment
share
Capital-
output
ratio
Predicted
growth rate
(percent)
Y L/ t α H/L I/GDP K/Y
0.5 7 0.45 0.5 2 - 3.3
0.5 7 0.45 0.3 2 - 2.4
0.5 7 0.45 0.5 - 1.3 3.2
0.5 7 0.45 0.3 - 1.3 2.5
aParameter assumptions: ρ θ α η δ= = + = = = =0 02 2 0 8 0 05 0 02 0. , , . , . , . ,g n .
Taking this model result at face value, the East German economy would be
predicted to reach a steady state below the West German level. This follows by solving
equation (7) for the difference between the steady state and initial income as
(22) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )log log log / log / log logy y Y t L t Y L A t A
e t
∗ − =
− − −
−
−
0
0 0 0
1 β
  ,
which equals 0.3 with Y t L t( ) / ( ) .= 0 6 , Y L( ) / ( ) .0 0 0 5= , and the standard
parameterization of preferences and technology as used before.
With initial labor productivity at 50 percent, the model predicts an East German
steady state of output per worker at about two thirds of the West German level[ ])0(35.1)0(* 3.0 yyey ⋅=⋅= . Future empirical research will have to prove whether
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these theoretical simulations, which are based on an implied lower East German stock
of human capital, bear any empirical significance. For the time being, they may be
considered as a reminder not to confuse the average level of formal schooling and
training of the workforce with a measure of the economically relevant stock of human
capital.
VI. Investing in Human Capital Through Worker Retraining
Programs?
Taking the simulation results of the previous section at face value, investing in
human capital appears to be an obvious policy response for the East German economy
to reach a higher level of output per worker. Improving the quality of schooling should
be an appropriate long-run strategy, not only in East Germany. But according to recent
empirical studies (Gundlach et al. 2001, Wößmann 2001), it remains questionable
whether such an end could actually be achieved by means of higher public expenditures
on schooling. Yet policymakers face an even more difficult question, namely how the
stock of human capital can be raised in the short run. Up to now, the answer has been a
to provide publicly funded worker retraining programs. These programs aim at reducing
the high level of structural unemployment in East Germany, which mainly reflects the
lack of human capital per worker at the prevailing level of wages.
Previous worker retraining measures in European countries and elsewhere have
generally not been found to produce significant positive effects (Heckman et al. 1999,
Martin 1998). In line with these research results, the more recent East German
experience also questions the presumed net social benefits of worker retraining
measures. Such a dismal assessment should be a matter for concern just because many
European countries spend fairly large amounts of resources on active labor market
programs. For instance in 1996, the average EU country spent 1.2 percent of GDP on
active labor market measures, which is more than twice as much as in countries like
Japan or the United States (Martin 1998). Public spending on active labor market
measures per unemployed person reached up to 30 percent of average output per worker
in Denmark and Sweden in 1996, compared to about 10 percent in the average EU
country. A similar picture emerges when the total number of persons engaged in labor
market measures is considered. About ten percent of the labor force in the average EU
country participated in active labor market measures in 1996. Within these measures,
worker retraining programs account for the largest share of active spending measures in
the average EU country (28 percent in 1996). Given these large resource flows,
questions are whether participants actually benefited from training programs and
whether these programs are worthwhile social investments.
In principle, retraining measures can improve and enhance the human capital of
workers and thereby raise their re-employment chances and their future wages. In the
context of a growth-theoretic framework, such measures could help to establish a higher
steady state level and hence a higher growth rate until the steady state is reached.
Retraining measures can also help to adjust the quality of existing labor supply to
structural changes in labor demand caused by new technologies and increased
competition on world markets, as in the case of East Germany after unification.
In practice, however, publicly funded retraining measures may not only have
positive effects. Future employers may understand participation in a retraining program
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as a signal of low worker productivity, or retraining may actually downgrade the
qualification of workers as compared to their previous level of human capital. Another
possibility is that re-employment of trained workers may only substitute for previously
employed workers, leaving the total level of unemployment unchanged.
Unfortunately, labor market programs in European OECD countries have been
rarely evaluated rigorously in the past. One reason for the lack of large-scale evidence
may be that in Western Europe, government assistance in retraining is often viewed as
something similar to a fundamental right which defies economic analysis. Another
reason may be that labor market programs often serve short run political purposes and
evaluations confirming their economic ineffectiveness are not welcomed by government
officials (Martin 1998). What follows summarizes some new evidence that comes from
labor retraining programs initiated to mitigate the rise in structural unemployment in
East Germany after unification.
The main point to note in any evaluation of worker retraining is that the effects
of a specific measure can only be clearly identified if there is a control group of workers
which did not receive training, but is otherwise identical to the group of workers which
did receive training. The difference in re-employment probabilities and wages could
then be ascribed to the specific training measure imposed. Without such a setting,
results necessarily remain ambiguous.
Many studies, especially in European countries, evaluate the success of a
retraining measure without comparing the presumed employment and wage effects with
those of a control group of workers and can, therefore, hardly be considered as
representing convincing evidence. Other so-called quasi-experimental studies select
treatment and control groups after the retraining measure was implemented and use
statistical techniques to control for differences in the characteristics of the two groups
compared. Despite their statistical complexity, such studies provide more reliable
estimates of the effectiveness of worker retraining. This is because at least in principle,
they can identify the change in re-employment probabilities and wages that is due only
to the training measure imposed, and not to other factors.
In East Germany, more than 50 percent of all working-age persons participated
in worker retraining measures in 1989-1994 (Hübler 1997). Yet the East German
experience with worker retraining measures paints a dismal picture. Spending on worker
retraining was extremely high by historical and by international standards, but the
employment and especially the wage effects appear to be close to zero and may in some
cases even be negative. This assessment is based on the findings of several studies
which rely on advanced microeconometric methods to address the selectivity problem.
That is, these studies measure wage and employment effects of retraining measures
relative to wage and employment effects of otherwise identical workers which did not
receive training.8 For instance,
                                                
8
 These studies use data from two sources. One is the German Socio Economic Panel (GSEP).
Since 1990, the GSEP includes a sample of just under 2000 East German households. The other
is the so-called Labor Market Monitor (LMM), which is a mail survey conducted every 4 to 6
months. The number of observations is higher in the LMM than in the GSEP, but the LMM
lacks the variables needed for nonparametrically identifying the effects of training measures and
hence requires specific modeling strategies.
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• Hübler (1997) finds negative short run employment effects of retraining, and
small positive effects for men only in the longer run (without considering possible
replacement effects and the implied return on the investment measures). For
women, however, training measures only appear to precede becoming
unemployed.
• Fitzenberger and Prey (1997) find that in contrast to on-the-job training, public
training measures do not generate statistically significant effects.
• Kraus et al. (1999) find that in the first phase of the East German transition
process, when the institutions that delivered the training programs were set up,
there were no positive effects of training on re-employment probabilities; small
positive employment effects appear to show up only after the institutional
structure of the programs was in place.
• Lechner (1999) finds that vocational training and retraining measures have a
negative impact on re-employment probabilities in the short run, probably because
participants reduced job search efforts as compared to non-participants; he finds
no significant effects several months after the training measure.
These by and large negative results are all the more remarkable because the
trainees in East Germany did not come from the low-skill-low-ability group which is the
target of many programs in other countries. By contrast, program participants in East
Germany were in general well educated and had fairly high job positions in the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR). These features again confirm the hypothesis that
the average level of formal schooling and training should not be confused with a
measure of the economically relevant stock of human capital.
Overall, the East German evidence on worker retraining measures suggests that
it will remain extremely difficult to design effective public training programs. But even
if it were possible to generate an effective retraining program at least for a certain group
of workers, policy makers should be aware that any program is unlikely to raise average
annual income for a substantial number of people. The empirical literature suggests that
a rate of return of investment in human capital through training measures of about 10
percent would be considered as high. That is, a thousand Euros spend on the retraining
of an unemployed worker would not raise her income by more than 100 Euros. Given
the limited resources available for retraining measures, and given that the return to
training measures is most likely to be substantially lower than 10 percent in practice, the
absolute effects on the steady-state level of labor productivity that can be achieved by
worker retraining measures appear to be limited.
Moreover, more rigorous econometric evaluations indicate that job search
assistance measures appear equally effective and costless than half of worker retraining
measures. This does not change the insight that any labor market measure is unlikely to
raise the steady state by a substantial amount, but it points to possible priorities where to
invest available public funds.
An important weakness of most existing studies is their microeconomic focus.
As such, they do not take into account that retraining measures have to be financed by
higher taxes and that retrained workers may simply displace employed workers. With
these macroeconomic repercussions on labor demand in mind, the social benefits of
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retraining measures would be considerably lower than the private benefits indicated by
otherwise scientifically valid evaluations.
Therefore, it seems that worker retraining measures will not suffice to achieve a
higher East German steady state. All available empirical evidence suggests that the
human capital of workers cannot be easily adapted to changing economic
circumstances, not even by costly retraining measures. Especially those retraining
measures that focus on older workers are bound to fail economically, and can only be
motivated for political reasons. Investing in human capital through effective schooling
of the young, and especially the very young, may prove to be a superior policy
alternative. The reason is quite simple: for the same level of investment at each age, the
return from spending on the young is higher because the old have a shorter working life
to recoup the investment made. For the case of East Germany, this insight means that
convergence of labor productivity to the West German level, if it evolves at all, is more
likely to take generations than decades, not to speak of the single decade that was
envisaged by some commentators early after unification.
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